I hope you are as excited as I am about the new 3d DCA pick.
Of course I’m referring to ITB # 10-001 Invitation to Bid for the Installation of a Replacement Air Conditioning System for the Main Building of the Third District Court of Appeal — submissions were due on the 29th!
What, did something else happen?
Ok, we’re happy about that too.
On to the composed ejaculations (hey, those synonyms come directly from thesaurus.com):
Agrofollajes v. DuPont:
Oh God this case is back yet again — it has more lives than Chucky.
Maybe the 3d ought to really sit and think before writing opinions on this case, because they always seem to have to do it again….and again:
We conclude that the operative facts of the individual plaintiffs were disparate and predominated over the common issues presented at trial. The consolidation resulted in prejudice to Du Pont. Consequently, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in consolidating the claims brought by the twenty seven plaintiffs against Du Pont. We thus reverse and remand these cases, with instructions that the claims be severed as individual plaintiffs in separate trials, by individual fernery or group of ferneries under common ownership or management.
In other words, kids, this one’s coming back….again.
I do like the part about whether the plaintiffs adequately pled the “microbe shift” theory, because it echoes my views on Iqbal:
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.110(b)(2) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the ultimate facts showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Unfortunately, the two operative complaints in this case were neither short nor plain. They were 37 and 38 pages each and contained 174 and 187 paragraphs respectively. Du Pont objects that the complaints were not long enough…..
Admittedly “microbe shift” is not specifically mentioned in the general allegations of negligence contained in the Euro Flores Amended Complaint, but we do not believe that such specificity is required. For example, plaintiffs are regularly allowed to plead that “the defendant negligently operated a vehicle so as to collide with the plaintiff’s vehicle and as a direct and proximate result of which the plaintiff was injured.” Under Du Pont’s argument, plaintiffs would have to plead specifically that plaintiff’s collar bone was broken when it struck the steering wheel. If the evidence showed that the collar bone was actually broken when it struck the door, then that would be an unpled theory.
See how simple that is!
Addison v. Carballosa:
Something about a defective horse.
Bennett v. Christiana Bank:
Gotta love process servers. Question — does this notation constitute proper service:
“Saw Curtains Move, Read Aloud Docs, SVP Docs at Door.”
The server then noted “East Wind, Rain” and not only served the hapless defendant but also launched the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
Those guys are good!